U.S. Third Circuit appeals court rejects New Jersey’s prohibition of lawyer’s website posts of excerpts of judicial opinions praising his legal work

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion which reversed a federal district court opinion upholding a New Jersey guideline prohibiting a lawyer from posting judicial opinion excerpts praising his legal work. The opinion is Andrew Dwyer et al v. Cynthia A. Cappell et al, No. 13-3235 (U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeal August 11, 2014) and the opinion is here: http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/133235p.pdf
According to the opinion, the lawyer had posted multiple excerpts of unpublished and public judicial opinions related to fee applications in employment discrimination cases brought under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination on his law firm website. One quote stated: ““The inescapable conclusion is . . . that plaintiffs achieved a spectacular result when the file was in the hands of Mr. Dwyer. . . . Mr. Dwyer was a fierce, if sometimes not disinterested advocate for his clients, and through an offensive and defensive motion practice and through other discovery methods molded the case to the point where it could be successfully resolved.”

A judge whose opinion quotes were posted on the lawyer’s website wrote to the lawyer in April 2008 and asked that the quotes be removed because he did not want his comments to be misconstrued as a blanket endorsement of the lawyer. The lawyer refused to remove any quotes and the New Jersey State Bar Association’s Committee on Attorney Advertising began examining the issue. The Committee and the New Jersey Bar Association ultimately produced Guideline 3, which was approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2012. Guideline 3 stated that an attorney “may not include, on a website or other advertisement, a quotation or excerpt from a court decision (oral or written) about the attorney’s abilities or legal services.” The guideline did permit a lawyer to post the entire text of a judicial opinion on the website or in an advertisement.

The U.S. District Court upheld Guideline 3 in June 2013; however, before the Guideline was to become effective, the lawyer filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming that Guideline 3 violated his First Amendment rights to engage in truthful commercial speech. The district court found against the lawyer and found that the Guideline was a mere disclosure requirement and not a direct restriction on the lawyer’s speech. In making its ruling, the district court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel (1985), which stated that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the district court’s opinion. The opinion confirmed that disclosure requirements receive less scrutiny than actual restrictions on speech and that the New Jersey Guideline had characteristics of both a disclosure requirement and a restriction on speech. The opinion did not address whether the Guideline was a restriction or a prohibition; however, it stated that even under the less restrictive standard of review for disclosure requirements, the Guideline was constitutionally flawed.

The appellate opinion stated that “Guideline 3 does not require disclosing anything that could reasonably remedy conceivable consumer deception stemming from (the lawyer’s) advertisement.” The opinion also listed an example of a disclosure that would be sufficient: “This is an excerpt of a judicial opinion from a specific legal dispute. It is not an endorsement of my abilities.” Since Guideline 3 required a lawyer to post entire judicial opinions, it “effectively precludes advertising with accurate excerpts from judicial opinions on (the lawyer’s) website, it is unduly burdensome.”

“Guideline 3 as applied to (the lawyer’s) accurate quotes from judicial opinions thus violates his First Amendment right to advertise his commercial services. Requiring (the lawyer) to reprint in full on his firm’s website the opinions noted above is not reasonably related to preventing consumer deception. To the extent the excerpts of these opinions could possibly mislead the public, that potential deception is not clarified by Guideline 3. In any event, what is required by the Guideline overly burdens (the lawyer’s) right to advertise. We thus reverse the order of the District Court and remand the case.

Bottom line: This is a significant First Amendment decision related to lawyer advertising which found that New Jersey Guideline 3, which prohibited a lawyer from publishing excerpts of judicial opinions on his website, was an unconstitutional restriction on the lawyer’s commercial speech. The opinion did approve of the use of a disclosure/disclaimer to prevent any consumer confusion related to the opinion excerpts.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer: this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire
Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.
2454 McMullen Booth Road, Suite 431
Clearwater, Florida 33759
Office (727) 799-1688
Fax (727) 799-1670
jcorsmeier@jac-law.com
http://www.jac-law.com

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Law firm requests Florida Supreme Court to invoke discretionary jurisdiction challenging judge’s finding that Facebook “friendship” with lawyer is not disqualifying

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert update which will discuss the recent (10/17/17) Notice that was filed with the Florida Third District Court of Appeal (and docketed with the Florida Supreme Court) seeking to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of Florida Supreme Court and challenging the appeals court decision which declined to disqualify a Miami-Dade County Circuit Judge who was “friends” with opposing counsel on Facebook.  The 3rd DCA case is Law Offices of Herssein and Herssein, P.A. d/b/a Herssein Law Group and Reuven T. Herssein v. United Services Automobile Association, Case No.: 3D17-1421, Lower Tribunal No.: 2015-015825-CA-43 (Florida 3rd DCA) and the Supreme Court case number is SC17-1848.  The Notice and 3rd DCA opinion are here:  https://efactssc-public.flcourts.org/casedocuments/2017/1848/2017-1848_notice_82684_e81d.pdf and the SC docket with the filing is here: http://jweb.flcourts.org/pls/docket/ds_docket?p_caseyear=2017&p_casenumber=1848

As I previously blogged on 8/4/17 and 8/24/17, the 3rd DCA upheld the decision of Miami-Dade Circuit Judge Beatrice Butchko that she was not required to recuse herself from a case in which she was a Facebook” friend” of the lawyer for one of the parties.  The lawyer was also a former judge with whom she worked before he stepped down as a judge.  This decision diverges from a 4th DCA opinion as well as an opinion of the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (JEAC).  The 3rd DCA opinion states:

“A random name drawn from a list of Facebook ‘friends’ probably belongs to casual friend, an acquaintance, an old classmate, a person with whom the member shares a common hobby, a ‘friend of a friend’ or even a local celebrity like a coach.  An assumption that all Facebook ‘friends’ rise to the level of a close relationship that warrants disqualification simply does not reflect the current nature of this type of electronic social networking.”

The Herssein law firm then moved to disqualify the judge from presiding over a contract dispute against their client, the United States Automobile Association (USAA) in which Reyes represents a non-party USAA employee in the matter, who was identified as a potential witness/party.  The law firm argued that the judge could not be impartial in the case and cited JEAC Op. 2009-20 (Nov.17, 2009).  That opinion states: “Listing lawyers who may appear before the judge as ‘friends’ on a judge’s social networking page reasonably conveys to others the impression that these lawyer ‘friends’ are in a special position to influence the judge.”  In 2012, the 4th DCA relied on the JEAC opinion in disqualifying a judge from a case for being Facebook friends with the criminal prosecutor. Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

The 3rd DCA opinion states that Facebook friendships could represent a close relationship that would require disqualification, however, many do not.  The opinion concluded:

“In fairness to the Fourth District’s decision in Domville and the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee’s 2009 opinion, electronic social media is evolving at an exponential rate. Acceptance as a Facebook “friend” may well once have given the impression of close friendship and affiliation. Currently, however, the degree of intimacy among Facebook “friends” varies greatly. The designation of a person as a “friend” on Facebook does not differentiate between a close friend and a distant acquaintance. Because a “friend” on a social networking website is not necessarily a friend in the traditional sense of the word, we hold that the mere fact that a judge is a Facebook “friend” with a lawyer for a potential party or witness, without more, does not provide a basis for a well-grounded fear that the judge cannot be impartial or that the judge is under the influence of the Facebook “friend.” On this point we respectfully acknowledge we are in conflict with the opinion of our sister court in Domville.”

The Herssein law firm has filed a Notice with the 3rd DCA (which was received and docketed with the Florida Supreme Court on 10/17/17) asking the Florida Supreme Court to invoke its discretionary jurisdiction to review the decision under Article V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const., and Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (iv). In support of the request, the Notice states:  “The decision expressly and directly affects a class of constitutional or state officers; all V judges in Florida, and the decision expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of another district court of appeal on the same question of law.”

Bottom line:  As I said in my previous blogs, the 3rd DCA opinion is contrary to the 2009 JEAC opinion and the 2012 4th  DCA opinion and acknowledges that it is in conflict with that opinion; however, it does provide the rationale that each case should be decided  by examining the facts and the relationship.  This would seem to open up potential confusion and potential disqualification motions that would have to be decided on a case by case basis.  This Notice seeks to have the Florida Supreme Court invoke its discretionary jurisdiction review and reverse the 3rd DCA’s decision.

It is still strongly recommended that judges and lawyers who may appear before them would be well advised not to be “friends” or otherwise connect on social media and professional networking sites or, if they are already connected and a case is assigned, to immediately remove the connection, disclose it to all parties, and (the judge may) possibly provide an option to recuse if the party believes that it could be potentially prejudiced.

Stay tuned…and be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Proposed Florida Bar rule initiated by Florida lawyer would make court finding of frivolousness “conclusive determination” of rule violation

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the Petition initiated by a Florida lawyer to amend the Bar rules and provide that a court determination that an action violates F.S. §57.105, Florida appellate Rule 9.410, or Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “constitutes a conclusive determination of guilt of misconduct by the lawyer(s) who prosecuted such frivolous claim or defense for violation of Rule 4-3.1.”  The Florida Bar published a Notice in the Florida Bar News that the petition will be filed on November 6, 2017 and members may comment on the Petition after it is filed.  The Bar Notice is here: 10-1-17 Bar News Notice of Filing Petition to Amend Rule.

The proposed rule revision would amend Florida Bar Rule 3-4.3 (misconduct or minor misconduct), by adding a section on frivolous actions which would provide if any Florida or federal appellate court has determined that a court action violated F.S. §57.105, Florida appellate Rule 9.410, or Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that “constitutes a conclusive determination of guilt of misconduct by the lawyer(s) who prosecuted such frivolous claim or defense for violation of Rule 4-3.1.”  Upon being notified of the finding, The Florida Bar would open a file, which would be sent to the grievance committee for review.

The proposed rule also provides that, unless there are aggravating circumstances, the referee or grievance committee considering the complaint can resolve the matter with an admonishment or referral of the lawyer to the Bar’s diversion program (lawyers would be eligible for diversion once every five years under the proposed rule).

The proposed rule would also require a lawyer who has had an appellate ruling that the a lawyer has violated the rules or state law on frivolous actions to notify the Bar within 10 days with copies to opposing counsel. Bar counsel would then docket the case “and The Florida Bar shall prosecute the misconduct in accordance with the rules considering the conclusive determination of a violation of Rule 4-3.1.”

The proposal would also amend the comment to Rule 4-3.1 to refer to the amendment to Rule 3-4.3. The comment to Rule 3-4.3 also provides that, “A lawyer shall not use any funds held in his trust account for payment of any personal obligation imposed upon the lawyer or the lawyer’s law firm as to sanctions pursuant to Section 57.105, Fla. Stats., Rule 9.410 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other similar statute or rule.”

The Florida Bar Rules allow members to directly propose amendments to Bar rules if the there is a petition filed with the Supreme Court signed by 50 Bar members.  This petition was signed by 55 Bar members.  The Board of Governors’ Disciplinary Procedure Committee (DPC) will review the proposed petition and rule amendments and will have a special meeting to discuss it.  A report by the DPC on the petition is expected at the Dec. 8, 2017 BOG meeting.

Bottom line:  This is rare member initiated petition to amend the Florida Bar Rules.  The amendment certainly appears to be well intended; however, since an order finding that a claim or defense is frivolous does not involve a criminal conviction, I am very concerned that the proposed rule that would make an order finding a frivolous filing by an appellate court on a civil matter “a conclusive determination of guilt of misconduct by the lawyer(s) who prosecuted such frivolous claim or defense for violation of Rule 4-3.1.”  I believe (and continue to believe) that a lawyer should be able to challenge such a court order since, among other things, the action and parties are different and the evidentiary requirements underlying such an order are not necessarily the same as those required for the Bar to prove a violation of the Bar rules.  In addition, the courts have inherent authority to sanction lawyers for frivolous filings as well as under the relevant statutes and court rules.

According to the Bar’s October 1, 2017 Notice in the Florida Bar News:

“Members who desire to comment on this proposed amendment may do so within 30 days of the filing of the above-referenced petition. Comments must be filed directly with the clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, and a copy must be served on the executive director of The Florida Bar and Thomas O. Wells, Esq. Rule 1-12.1 and Rule 3-7.15 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar govern these proceedings.”

Stay tuned…and be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19 N. Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Joseph Corsmeier

about.me/corsmeierethicsblogs

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Filed under Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Florida Bar, Florida Bar - petition to make finding of frivolous filing conclusive proof of Bar rule violation, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer filing frivolous pleading, Lawyer Professionalism, Lawyer sanctions, Lawyer sanctions for frivolous filings

Louisiana lawyer suspended for submitting false billable hours because he believed his partnership status required them

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent Louisiana Supreme Court Opinion suspending a lawyer for 30 months with all but one (1) year deferred for false billable hours that he believed were necessary to maintain his partnership position and “in an effort to make himself look better on paper each month.”   The disciplinary case is:  In re: Kenneth Todd Wallace, Case No. 2017-B-0525.  The disciplinary opinion is dated September 22, 2017 and is here:  http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2017/17B0525.OPN.pdf

According to the opinion, the lawyer “joined the law firm of Liskow & Lewis as an associate attorney in 1998. After his promotion to shareholder in 2005, he served as the firm’s hiring partner and head of recruiting. He also chaired the firm’s diversity committee as the firm’s first minority recruiting and retention partner. In 2012, respondent was elected to the firm’s board of directors and served as the board’s junior director through April 2015.”

The lawyer stated that he made the false billing entries because he was concerned that his correct billable hours (along with an insufficient number of clients) were not adequate for a partner with his status.  “When his practice began to decline, (the lawyer) gave in to his own internal pressures and began to submit false time on a dismissed contingency fee matter, and eventually other matters, in an effort to make himself look better on paper each month.”

After the law firm became aware of his false billing in some client matters, the lawyer assisted the firm in conducting a full investigation.  The firm’s investigation showed that, between 2012 through 2015, the lawyer submitted 428 billing entries that the firm believed were “certainly false” and another 220 entries that the firm believed could be false or inflated; however, the law firm concluded that none of the false billing entries adversely affected any of the firm’s clients.

The lawyer had received $85,000.00 in merit bonuses between 2012 through 2015 and the firm concluded he would have received some or all of the bonuses even if he had not inflated his billable hours. The lawyer had also spent significant time with his firm management and committee responsibilities and had also met or exceeded billable targets during the years in question.  The lawyer resigned from the firm in 2015 and gave up his available bonus.

The disciplinary opinion imposed a 30 month suspension with all but one-year deferred.  The suspension was also made retroactive to January 2016, when the lawyer had been suspended on an interim basis pending the outcome of the matter.

Bottom line:  This is a very clear and unfortunate example of a lawyer who most likely destroyed his legal career after succumbing to the stress and pressure of a law partner’s need for large billable hours and a large number of clients (book of business).  I would imagine that, if asked, this lawyer would tell you that it was not worth it.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19 N. Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Joseph Corsmeier

about.me/corsmeierethicsblogs

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Filed under Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Attorney misrepresentation, fraud, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer discipline false client billings, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer false statements, Lawyer sanctions, Lawyers false billings discipline

Federal district judge dismisses lawsuit alleging that the North Carolina’s regulation of UPL is unconstitutional

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent opinion of a federal district judge in North Carolina dismissing a non-profit corporation’s claims that the state’s UPL statute is unconstitutional.  The case is: Capital Associated Industries Inc. v. Josh Stein et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00083 (U.S. District Court, Middle District of North Carolina).  The September 19, 2017 order and opinion is here: http://www.abajournal.com/images/main_images/NCBar.pdf

A corporation called Capital Associated Industries Inc. (CAI) filed the lawsuit after the North Carolina State Bar issued a proposed ethics opinion which found that CAI’s plan to provide legal services would constitute unlawful UPL.

According to the order and opinion of U.S. District Judge Loretta Biggs, CAI is a non-profit (and non-legal) corporation which provides human resources services to members, who pay annual dues. The corporation proposed to provide employment-related legal advice through its own lawyers as part of its membership services. It also proposed charging a separate fee of $195.00 an hour for other legal services, including drafting employment agreements and potential representation before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

CAI argued that North Carolina’s UPL Statutes, as applied to them, “violate CAI’s right to substantive due process because the statutes are not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest.  The State Bar responds that the NC UPL Statutes “are rationally related to North Carolina’s interest in avoiding potential ‘conflicts of interest and loyalty,’ as well as its interest in avoiding the ‘impairment of attorney independence.’”

The order and opinion held that the statute was sufficiently related to the government’s interest in avoiding potential conflicts of interest and loyalty, and in avoiding the impairment of attorney independence.  “North Carolina could rationally decide that nonlawyers would be more likely than lawyers to encourage the attorneys whom they supervise to violate the ethical canons that govern the legal profession.”

CAI also argued that the UPL Statutes “violate the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, as applied to its proposed provision of legal services.  Specifically, CAI argues that the UPL Statutes restrict CAI’s speech on the basis of its content; that the UPL Statutes prohibit CAI from speaking on the basis of its corporate identity; and that this restriction on its speech cannot survive strict scrutiny.  The State Bar argues that the UPL Statutes operate as permissible regulation of a profession and not a restriction on speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection.”

The order and opinion stated that the UPL statute is not subject to strict First Amendment scrutiny since CAI’s proposed communications with members on employee legal questions are professional speech.  “The Fourth Circuit has held that under the professional speech doctrine, ‘a state’s regulation of a profession raises no First Amendment problem where it amounts to ‘generally applicable licensing provisions’ affecting those who practice the profession.’”  Pursuant to same, CAI “has no First Amendment right to advertise legal services since its right to provide such services is unlawful under the (UPL) statutes.”   According to media reports, CAI’s attorney has stated that the organization will appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Bottom line:  This opinion appears to strengthen the regulation of UPL by state Bars such as the North Carolina Bar.  The opinion also analyzes the constitutional scrutiny that applies in cases involving the regulation of professional speech “where it amounts to ‘generally applicable licensing provisions’ affecting those who practice the profession.”

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19 N. Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Joseph Corsmeier

about.me/corsmeierethicsblogs

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Filed under joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, U.S. Constitution and UPL regulation- professional speech and application of UPL rules, Unauthorized practice of law, Unlicensed practice of law, UPL and professional speech, UPL North Carolina federal judge opinion on regulation of UPL

Four south Florida lawyers arrested for involvement for illegal personal injury solicitation and provider kickbacks

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent arrests of four south Florida lawyers who are  alleged to have improperly and illegally obtained personal injury victims as clients and referred them to health care facilities which then paid them cash for the referrals.

According to media articles and criminal charging documents, four south Florida lawyers have been charged with crimes  ranging from money laundering to organized fraud and patient brokering.  The lawyers are Steven Slootsky, whose record Bar address is in Boca Raton, and Adam Hurtig, Mark Spatz, and Vincent Pravato, whose record Bar addresses are in Fort Lauderdale.  The lawyers were arrested on or about September 6, 2017.

The lawyers are alleged to have improperly and illegally obtained personal injury victims as clients and referred them to health care facilities which paid cash to the lawyers for the referrals.  According to arrest records, the lawyers allegedly paid runners from towing companies and body shops to improperly solicit victims of motor vehicle accidents.  Those individuals were allegedly then referred to clinics for medical treatment and the clinics would illegally pay for the referrals.

The arrest report states that the lawyers “were actively involved in illegal patient brokering and the unlawful solicitation of motor-vehicle accident victims throughout South Florida…after the patient was brokered to the health care facility, the facility was then able to begin treatment and bill the auto insurance companies for claims covered by the PIP benefits, which resulted in fraud on the insurance companies.”

It is illegal under federal law for a doctor, clinic, or other health care provider to pay for patient referrals and for a “patient broker” to receive kickbacks for sending patients to a health care provider.  It is also a violation of the Florida Bar Rules for an agent of a lawyer to improperly solicit a client, for a lawyer to pay non-lawyers and clinics for referrals, and for the lawyer to receive payment or a fee based upon an improper solicitation.  Of course, it is certainly a violation of the Florida Bar Rules to commit a crime.

Bottom line: I have heard anecdotally that these activities have been occurring in south Florida for many years (and potentially throughout our entire state, particularly in urban areas).  These lawyers are certainly presumed innocent unless and until they are proven guilty; however, if the allegations are shown to be true, this is an extremely unfortunate blight on the legal profession.  On the other hand, this could potentially discourage others from doing (or continuing to do) this in the future.

Be careful out there.     Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19 N. Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, deceit, dishonesty, fee sharing, fraud, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer advertising and solicitation, Lawyer criminal conduct, Lawyer criminal conduct - kickbacks on referrals, Lawyer criminal kickbacks, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, lawyer illegal personal injury solicitation and provider kickbacks, lawyer improper solicitation through agents, Lawyer referral fees, Uncategorized