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Lawyer’s ethical duties and responsibilities when a represented person requests a second opinion

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the lawyer’s ethical duties and responsibilities when a represented person contacts the lawyer to obtain a second opinion.  Although a lawyer is permitted to render a second opinion to a represented person who initiates the contact with the lawyer, there are important ethical and practical issues which should be considered before the lawyer agrees to do so.

A threshold issue is whether a second opinion would be an improper communication with a person represented by counsel.  In 2002, the ABA added a sentence to paragraph 4 of the Comment to Model Rule 4.2 which makes it clear that lawyers can provide second opinions if the lawyer is not representing another individual in the same matter.  Model Rule 4.2 has been adopted in substantial form by most jurisdictions, including Florida.  The Comment states:

(4) This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter.

Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 02-5 (March 3, 2013, rev. August 24, 2011) discusses types of information a lawyer can give to an individual who is seeking a second opinion as well as potential solicitation.  The opinion states that, a lawyer may provide information about the lawyer’s availability and qualifications when contacted by an individual and if the information is requested.

The opinion concludes:

… a lawyer may provide a second opinion to a person who is represented by counsel at the person’s request. In providing the second opinion, the lawyer must give competent advice, and in doing so should carefully consider any limitations with which the lawyer is faced. Rule 4-1.1, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. The lawyer should scrupulously avoid improperly soliciting the person. The lawyer may discuss what services the lawyer would be able to provide if the represented person requests not merely a second opinion, but also information about the lawyer’s availability and qualifications. Whether or not particular communications between the lawyer and the represented person might be considered tortious interference with an existing lawyer-client relationship is a legal question, outside the scope of an ethics opinion.

As is stated in the above ethics opinion, before giving a second opinion, the lawyer should consider whether he or she can competently render the opinion.  In order to be competent, the lawyer might need to review the client’s file, which may only be available through the client’s current lawyer.

South Carolina Bar Opinion 97-07 (1997) states:

…A lawyer may discuss a pending legal matter with a client who is represented by another attorney. If the client is seeking a second opinion based on a subjective opinion rendered by the client’s attorney, the lawyer should carefully consider the basis of the advice of the client’s attorney and may be required to consult with the client’s attorney in order to give competent legal advice. If so, the lawyer should advise the client accordingly prior to giving any opinion or advice.

A lawyer who provides a second opinion is also creating an attorney/client relationship and attorney/client confidentiality would apply.  The scope of confidentiality is extremely broad and includes all information related to the representation, including the fact that the client came to the lawyer for a consultation; therefore, the lawyer would not be able to contact the person’s current lawyer, unless the client consents or there is an exception to the confidentiality rule.

Oregon State Bar Opinion 2005-81 (Revised 2014) states:

A lawyer may provide a second opinion to a potential client regarding the quality of work done by another lawyer. The lawyer may not inform the other lawyer of the client’s request unless the client consents or another exception to the duty of confidentiality is applicable.

Bottom line:  It is not unethical for a lawyer to provide a second opinion; however, there are important ethical and practical issues that a lawyer should consider before agreeing to do so.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under Attorney Ethics, Confidentiality, Florida Bar, Florida Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, lawyer confidentiality, Uncategorized

Florida Supreme Court dismisses Florida Bar’s petition proposing substantial revisions to lawyer referral service rules

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert Update which will update my August 1, 2016 Ethics Alert and will discuss the recent Florida Supreme Court Order (May 3, 2017) dismissing the Bar’s petition for approval of the proposed substantial revisions to the Bar Rules related to lawyer referral services.

The proposed rules would have substantially revised the current rules, changed the name of the referral companies to “matching services” and “qualifying providers”, specifically prohibited fee splitting and deleted the disclaimer that the entity is a lawyer referral service.  The proposed rules would not have limited ownership to lawyers only or referrals to lawyers only.

The case is: In Re: Amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Subchapter 4-7 (Lawyer Referral Services, Case No.: SC16-1470 and the Supreme Court’s Order May 3, 2017 is here:  https://efactssc-public.flcourts.org/casedocuments/2016/1470/2016-1470_disposition_138549.pdf

Under the proposed amendments, which were approved by the Florida Bar Board of Governors in 2016, any private entities that connect consumers looking for legal services with lawyers would have been called “qualifying providers” regardless of whether they were “traditional” referral services (such as ASK-GARY or 411 PAIN) or a technology-based provider (such as AVVO or LegalZoom).

The Florida Bar’s website has a page summarizing the proposed rule revisions as well as a frequently asked questions section and comparison chart.  The link to that page is here:  http://www.floridabar.org/proposedlrsamend#Overview.

The May 3, 2017 Florida Supreme Court Order states:

Previously, in In re Amend. to Rule Reg. The Fla. Bar 4-7.22—Lawyer Referral Services, 175 So. 3d 779, 781 (Fla. 2015), the Court rejected amendments to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-7.22 proposed by The Florida Bar and directed the Bar to propose amendments that “preclude Florida lawyers from accepting referrals from any lawyer referral service that is not owned or operated by a member of the Bar.” In this case, the Bar proposes amendments to rule 4-7.22 that do not comply with the Court’s direction concerning lawyer referral services that are not owned or operated by a member of the Bar and that seek to expand the scope of the rule to include “matching services” and other similar services not currently regulated by the Bar. (emphasis supplied).

The Court having considered the Bar’s prior petition, the amendments proposed in this case, the comments filed, the Bar’s response, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Bar’s petition in this case is hereby dismissed without prejudice to allow the members of this Court to engage in informed discussions with the Bar and those who are in favor or against the proposed regulation of matching and other similar services. The Court lacks sufficient background information on such services and their regulation at this time.

No rehearing will be entertained by this Court.

Bottom line:  As I previously stated, if approved by the Florida Supreme Court, the proposed revisions would have substantially altered the rules for lawyer referral services; however, the proposed rules would not have limited ownership to lawyers nor referrals only to lawyers.  This Order makes it clear that the that the proposed rules “do not comply with the Court’s direction concerning lawyer referral services that are not owned or operated by a member of the Bar and that seek to expand the scope of the rule to include ‘matching services’ and other similar services not currently regulated by the Bar.”

The Florida Bar will now ponder the language of the Supreme Court’s Order in considering potential future proposed lawyer referral rule revisions.  Stay tuned…

…and be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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ABA Formal Opinion 477 addresses lawyer ethical duties when transmitting client information over the internet

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss ABA Formal Opinion 477, which was issued on May 11, 2017. The opinions addresses a lawyer’s ethical responsibilities to secure client confidential information when transmitting the information over the internet.  The Formal Opinion is here: ABA Formal Opinion 477.

ABA Formal Opinion 477 is an update opinion which specifically addresses “securing communication of protected client information” over the internet.

The Formal Opinion states:  “(i)n Formal Opinion 99-413 this Committee addressed a lawyer’s confidentiality obligations for e-mail communications with clients.  While the basic obligations of confidentiality remain applicable today, the role and risks of technology in the practice of law have evolved since 1999 prompting the need to update Opinion 99-413.  Formal Opinion 99-413 concluded: ‘Lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all forms of e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some risk of interception and disclosure. It therefore follows that its use is consistent with the duty under Rule 1.6 to use reasonable means to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to a client’s representation.’ (footnote omitted).”

“Unlike 1999 where multiple methods of communication were prevalent, today, many lawyers primarily use electronic means to communicate and exchange documents with clients, other lawyers, and even with other persons who are assisting a lawyer in delivering legal services to clients.”

The opinion concludes: “A lawyer generally may transmit information relating to the representation of a client over the internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct where the lawyer has undertaken reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access. However, a lawyer may be required to take special security precautions to protect against the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of client information when required by an agreement with the client or by law, or when the nature of the information requires a higher degree of security.”

Bottom line:  This ABA opinion addresses the ethical issues related to securing client communications when transmitting confidential information over the internet under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and is for guidance only and is not binding; however, the analysis would be applicable in most, if not all jurisdictions, including Florida.  Lawyers should consult the rules and ethics opinions of their jurisdiction for further guidance.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this ethics alert is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under ABA formal opinions, Attorney/client confidentiality, Confidentiality, Confidentiality and privilege, lawyer confidentiality, Lawyer ethical duties when sending confidential information over the internet, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Uncategorized

U.S. Supreme Court holds that bad faith fee sanction under court’s inherent authority is limited to fees incurred solely from the misconduct

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the important and very recent United States Supreme Court opinion which held that a bad faith fee sanction based upon a court’s inherent authority is limited to fees incurred solely as a result of the misconduct.  The case is Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., v. Haeger, 813 F. 3d 1233, No. 15–1406 (Argued January 10, 2017—Decided April 18, 2017).  The United States Supreme Court opinion is here:  https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1406_db8e.pdf

According to the opinion, which was delivered by Justice Kagan, the Haegers sued Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, alleging that the failure of a Goodyear G159 tire caused the family’s motorhome to swerve off the road and flip over.  “After several years of contentious discovery, marked by Goodyear’s slow response to repeated requests for internal G159 test results, the parties settled the case. Some months later, the Haegers’ lawyer learned that, in another lawsuit involving the G159, Goodyear had disclosed test results indicating that the tire got unusually hot at highway speeds. In subsequent correspondence, Goodyear conceded withholding the information from the Haegers, even though they had requested all testing data. The Haegers then sought sanctions for discovery fraud, urging that Goodyear’s misconduct entitled them to attorney’s fees and costs expended in the litigation.

“The District Court found that Goodyear had engaged in an extended course of misconduct. Exercising its inherent power to sanction bad-faith behavior, the court awarded the Haegers $2.7 million—the entire sum they had spent in legal fees and costs since the moment, early in the litigation, when Goodyear made its first dishonest discovery response. The court said that in the usual case, sanctions ordered pursuant to a court’s inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct must be limited to the amount of legal fees caused by that misconduct. But it determined that in cases of particularly egregious behavior, a court can award a party all of the attorney’s fees incurred in a case, without any need to find a “causal link between [the expenses and] the sanctionable conduct.” (citation omitted)

“As further support for its award, the District Court concluded that full and timely disclosure of the test results would likely have led Goodyear to settle the case much earlier. Acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit might require a link between the misconduct and the harm caused, however, the court also made a contingent award of $2 million. That smaller amount, designed to take effect if the Ninth Circuit reversed the larger award, deducted $700,000 in fees the Haegers incurred in developing claims against other defendants and proving their own medical damages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the full $2.7 million award, concluding that the District Court had properly awarded the Haegers all the fees they incurred during the time when Goodyear was acting in bad faith.

Goodyear argued that, due to the failure of the court to link the fee with the misconduct, the fee award should be reversed and an instruction to the trial court to reconsider the matter. The Haegers argued that the award should be upheld because the lower courts articulated and applied the appropriate but-for causation standard, or, even if they did not, the fee award in fact passes the but-for test.

“The Haegers’ defense of the lower courts’ reasoning is a non-starter: Neither court used the correct legal standard. The District Court specifically disclaimed the need for a causal link on the ground that this was a “truly egregious” case. 906 F. Supp. 2d, at 975. And the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court could grant all attorney’s fees incurred “during the time when [Goodyear was] acting in bad faith,” 813 F. 3d 1233, 1249—a temporal, not causal, limitation. A sanctioning court must determine which fees were incurred because of, and solely because of, the misconduct at issue, and no such finding lies behind the $2.7 million award made and affirmed below. Nor is this Court inclined to fill in the gap, as the Haegers urge. As an initial matter, the Haegers have not shown that this litigation would have settled as soon as Goodyear divulged the heat-test results (a showing that would justify an all-fees award from the moment Goodyear was supposed to disclose). Further, they cannot demonstrate that Goodyear’s non-disclosure so permeated the suit as to make that misconduct a but-for cause of every subsequent legal expense, totaling the full $2.7 million.”

“Although the District Court considered causation in arriving at its back-up award of $2 million, it is unclear whether its understanding of that requirement corresponds to the appropriate standard—an uncertainty pointing toward throwing out the fee award and instructing the trial court to consider the matter anew. However, the Haegers contend that Goodyear has waived any ability to challenge the contingent award since the $2 million sum reflects Goodyear’s own submission that only about $700,000 of the fees sought would have been incurred regardless of the company’s behavior. The Court of Appeals did not address that issue, and this Court declines to decide it in the first instance. The possibility of waiver should therefore be the initial order of business on remand.”

The opinion held that “(w)hen a federal court exercises its inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct by ordering a litigant to pay the other side’s legal fees, the award is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct—or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith.”  The case was reversed and remanded.

Bottom line: This U.S. Supreme Court opinion is important since it addresses and resolves (at least in the federal courts) the question of whether a court exercising its inherent authority to sanction bad faith misconduct by awarding fees must limit the fees to those incurred as a direct result of the lawyer’s misconduct.  The opinion found in the affirmative and that the fees awarded must be shown to have been incurred solely as a result of the misconduct.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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New Jersey lawyer receives censure for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and fraud and dishonesty

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent New Jersey Supreme Court Order which adopted the findings of the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board and censured a lawyer for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and engaging in conduct involving fraud or dishonesty.  The case is In The Matter of John R. Dusinberre, D-37 September Term 2015 078531 (Supreme Court of New Jersey April 5, 2017).  The New Jersey Supreme Court Order is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1082216 and the Disciplinary Board (DRB) Decision dated November 9, 2016 is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1077667

According to the DRB Decision, the lawyer was charged with violating Bar rules in four separate matters:

“In the first matter, respondent represented Anthony Domenick and 407-409 Summer Associates, LLC for a Paterson condominium development known as ‘Sandy Hill at Summer Street.’ The terms of the representation called for respondent to file a public offering statement (POS) with the New Jersey Division of Community Affairs (DCA) and to record a master deed in the county clerk’s office. Respondent told his client that he had filed the POS with the DCA and furnished him with a copy of a November 12, 2007 POS carrying registration number ‘04368.’ Respondent stipulated that he never filed a POS with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated the POS and created a fictitious registration number; the DCA had never assigned a registration number to the Sandy Hill project. Although respondent also failed to record the master deed, he either informed his client, or led him to believe, that he had done so.

“In a second matter, respondent represented a client identified only as ‘Mr. Cerquirra’ and ‘88 St. Francis LLC’ regarding a condominium development project at 88 St. Francis Street in Newark. The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA and to obtain a registration order. Respondent informed the client that he had obtained a registration order for the project from the DCA. He also gave the client an October 27, 2008 letter, purportedly from DCA’s Manager of the Planned Real Estate Department, Stewart P. Pallonis. Enclosed with that letter was an order of registration from the DCA carrying registration number 04487, and signed ‘Stewart P. Pallonis.’  In fact, respondent never registered the 88 St. Francis Street project with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated both the Pallonis letter and the registration order, signing Pallonis’ name to both documents before giving them to the client.

“In a third matter, respondent represented Sterling Properties (Sterling) for a Cedar Knolls condominium project known as ‘Viera at Hanover.’ The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA, but he failed to do so. Respondent, nevertheless, led Sterling to believe that he had registered the project with the DCA, knowing that he had not done so. In reliance on respondent’s false information, Sterling went forward with the project.

“In a fourth matter, respondent represented Sterling for another condominium project in Piscataway. That representation, too, required respondent to register the project with the DCA. Again, respondent failed to do so. Respondent led Sterling to believe that the Piscataway project, too, was registered with the DCA, knowing that it was not. Relying on respondent’s statements, Sterling proceeded with the development project.”

“During respondent’s entire thirty-four-year career at MSLD, he reported to Barry Mandelbaum, the managing attorney, and twelve years his senior. Respondent described Mandelbaum as a “benevolent despot” and a “mentor.” Respondent was never “encouraged” to generate business for the firm. Rather, he tended to work on legal matters that Mandelbaum generated.

“Respondent described his relationship with Mandelbaum as a stressful one. Mandelbaum would berate respondent publicly, place notes on respondent’s door about perceived failings, and subject him to ‘105 decibel,’ public ‘dress downs,’ all of which were extremely embarrassing.

“As the law firm grew larger, younger attorneys became partners. By the mid-2000s, some of those partners had come to expect respondent to complete work on projects that they had generated, placing additional pressure on respondent to perform.

“Several years before respondent engaged in the within misconduct, MSLD established an executive committee to manage the law firm. Respondent perceived that the new arrangement rewarded some of the younger, income-generating attorneys, at his expense. Feeling exposed, he became “terrified” about losing his job. At that juncture, he grew even more reliant on Mandelbaum for protection:

So my desire and drive to please him became extremely strong. And I can’t tell you the number of times when I would have an issue with a client, I would hear the client five minutes later on the phone with Barry and then I would hear Barry’s footsteps stomping down the hall to basically dress me down or yell at me and to confront me, or whatever it might be very publicly.

And it was extremely upsetting and got to the point where I went from a lawyer who loved to go to work every day to a lawyer who dreaded pulling into the parking lot of my law firm, counting whose cars were in to try and decide whose work I should be doing that day so that I wouldn’t get yelled at or — or, you know, almost — I almost use the word bullied, although I’m an adult and was an adult at the time, and it’s a hard concept to have, but it’s the desperate situation I found myself in. (T20-10 to T21-2.)

“Worried about being ‘kicked out’ of MSLD, respondent felt tremendous pressure to complete tasks on time, according to schedules that other attorneys prepared for him. Also pressing was the fear that, because he was over sixty years old and had never been in another legal setting, he could not strike out on his own.”

The DRB Decision also found that the lawyer had no prior discipline, expressed remorse for his misconduct, and paid former clients, the firm and the DCA hundreds of thousands of dollars as restitution.  The DRB recommended a censure (which is a stronger sanction than a reprimand in New Jersey).  The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted that sanction and censured the lawyer.

Bottom line:  This case is unusual, to say the least.  Although the lawyer provided significant mitigation (including the serious “berating” by a supervising partner and “cracking under the pressure” of the partner’s criticism), his underlying misconduct, including his multiple false statements to clients, neglecting client matters and failing to communicate, would appear to be serious enough to merit a suspension, notwithstanding the mitigation that he provided.  The lawyer was in his 50’s and 60’s when the misconduct occurred. One could certainly conclude that the lawyer’s testimony about the “pressure” of the practice was somewhat of an excuse and not an explanation.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Attorney misrepresentation, Communication with clients, deceit, dishonesty, fraud, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer false statements, Lawyer false statements to clients, Lawyer lack of communication with client, Lawyer lack of diligence, Lawyer lying to clients, Lawyer misrepresentation, Lawyer sanctions, Uncategorized

Washington State Bar suspends some ethics opinions because of antitrust concerns arising from 2015 U.S. Supreme Court opinion

Hello and welcome to this New Year’s Eve 2015 Ethics Alert blog which will discuss the recent decision of the Washington State Bar to suspend some ethics opinions because of antitrust concerns arising out of the U.S. Supreme Court’s February 2015 opinion in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission.  I previously blogged about the Supreme Court’s decision here: USSC NC dental licensing opinion, the LegalZoom antitrust lawsuit in North Carolina based upon the USSC opinion here: LegalZoom filed antitrust lawsuit against NC Bar and the settlement of that lawsuit here:  LegalZoom settles antitrust lawsuit against NC Bar.

According to a recent ABA Journal article, the Washington State Bar Association has advised its ethics committee to stop issuing ethics opinions which could be interpreted as having the effect of restraining trade in the legal services market.  The bar stated that it suspended the opinions so it could “proceed very deliberately” in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s February 2015 opinion in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission. 

That U.S. Supreme Court decision permitted an antitrust action against the North Carolina state dentistry board for its decision prohibiting non-dentists from whitening teeth to proceed. The opinion stated that when a state board is controlled by active market participants in the market it regulates, state-action antitrust immunity cannot be applied unless the restraint of trade is affirmatively expressed by state policy and the policy is actively supervised by the state.

Bottom line:  This is more fallout from the 2015 USSC Dental Board decision.  As I have stated in my previous blogs, there have been lawsuits against state Bars in the past attacking the entity’s state action immunity.  The Supreme Court opinion refers to three specific cases and appears to suggest that these cases should be interpreted to mean that only the actions of a state entity which is actively supervised by the state (i.e. the Supreme Court in the case of a state Bar) have antitrust immunity and the rest of the entity’s actions may not have such immunity.

I wish you and yours a very happy and healthy 2016!

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement and does not contain any legal advice and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

2454 McMullen Booth Road, Suite 431

Clearwater, Florida 33759

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY:  This electronic communication and the information contained herein is legally privileged and confidential proprietary information intended only for the individual and/or entity to whom it is addressed pursuant to the American Bar Association Formal Opinion No. 99-413, dated March 10, 1999 and all other applicable laws and rules.  If you receive this transmission in error, you are advised that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or the taking of any action in reliance upon the communication is strictly prohibited.  Any unauthorized use, distribution, or disclosure of this communication is strictly prohibited.  If you have received this in error, please notify us immediately by return e-mail at the above telephone number and then delete message entirely from your system.  Thank you for your cooperation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Ohio lawyer suspended indefinitely after conviction for filing false documents with IRS and falsifying e-mail in malpractice action

Ohio lawyer suspended indefinitely after conviction for filing false documents with IRS and falsifying e-mail in malpractice action.

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