Tag Archives: joseph corsmeier

Lawyer’s ethical duties and responsibilities when a represented person requests a second opinion

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the lawyer’s ethical duties and responsibilities when a represented person contacts the lawyer to obtain a second opinion.  Although a lawyer is permitted to render a second opinion to a represented person who initiates the contact with the lawyer, there are important ethical and practical issues which should be considered before the lawyer agrees to do so.

A threshold issue is whether a second opinion would be an improper communication with a person represented by counsel.  In 2002, the ABA added a sentence to paragraph 4 of the Comment to Model Rule 4.2 which makes it clear that lawyers can provide second opinions if the lawyer is not representing another individual in the same matter.  Model Rule 4.2 has been adopted in substantial form by most jurisdictions, including Florida.  The Comment states:

(4) This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter.

Florida Bar Ethics Opinion 02-5 (March 3, 2013, rev. August 24, 2011) discusses types of information a lawyer can give to an individual who is seeking a second opinion as well as potential solicitation.  The opinion states that, a lawyer may provide information about the lawyer’s availability and qualifications when contacted by an individual and if the information is requested.

The opinion concludes:

… a lawyer may provide a second opinion to a person who is represented by counsel at the person’s request. In providing the second opinion, the lawyer must give competent advice, and in doing so should carefully consider any limitations with which the lawyer is faced. Rule 4-1.1, Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. The lawyer should scrupulously avoid improperly soliciting the person. The lawyer may discuss what services the lawyer would be able to provide if the represented person requests not merely a second opinion, but also information about the lawyer’s availability and qualifications. Whether or not particular communications between the lawyer and the represented person might be considered tortious interference with an existing lawyer-client relationship is a legal question, outside the scope of an ethics opinion.

As is stated in the above ethics opinion, before giving a second opinion, the lawyer should consider whether he or she can competently render the opinion.  In order to be competent, the lawyer might need to review the client’s file, which may only be available through the client’s current lawyer.

South Carolina Bar Opinion 97-07 (1997) states:

…A lawyer may discuss a pending legal matter with a client who is represented by another attorney. If the client is seeking a second opinion based on a subjective opinion rendered by the client’s attorney, the lawyer should carefully consider the basis of the advice of the client’s attorney and may be required to consult with the client’s attorney in order to give competent legal advice. If so, the lawyer should advise the client accordingly prior to giving any opinion or advice.

A lawyer who provides a second opinion is also creating an attorney/client relationship and attorney/client confidentiality would apply.  The scope of confidentiality is extremely broad and includes all information related to the representation, including the fact that the client came to the lawyer for a consultation; therefore, the lawyer would not be able to contact the person’s current lawyer, unless the client consents or there is an exception to the confidentiality rule.

Oregon State Bar Opinion 2005-81 (Revised 2014) states:

A lawyer may provide a second opinion to a potential client regarding the quality of work done by another lawyer. The lawyer may not inform the other lawyer of the client’s request unless the client consents or another exception to the duty of confidentiality is applicable.

Bottom line:  It is not unethical for a lawyer to provide a second opinion; however, there are important ethical and practical issues that a lawyer should consider before agreeing to do so.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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ABA revises recent Formal Opinion 477, which addresses lawyer ethics issues when transmitting confidential information over the internet

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert update which will discuss Revised ABA Formal Opinion 477, which was issued on May 22, 2017. The opinions addresses a lawyer’s ethical responsibilities to secure client confidential information when transmitting the information over the internet.  According to the ABA, Formal Opinion 477 was revised to clarify that the opinion does not alter Formal Ethics Opinion 11-459 and to note that the change in Model Rule 1.6(c) supported 11-459. There are no substantive changes to the opinion.  The revised Formal Opinion is here: Revised ABA Formal Opinion 477.

ABA Formal Opinion 477 states:  “In Formal Opinion 99-413 this Committee addressed a lawyer’s confidentiality obligations for e-mail communications with clients.  While the basic obligations of confidentiality remain applicable today, the role and risks of technology in the practice of law have evolved since 1999 prompting the need to update Opinion 99-413.  Formal Opinion 99-413 concluded: ‘Lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all forms of e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some risk of interception and disclosure. It therefore follows that its use is consistent with the duty under Rule 1.6 to use reasonable means to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to a client’s representation.’ (footnote omitted).”

“Unlike 1999 where multiple methods of communication were prevalent, today, many lawyers primarily use electronic means to communicate and exchange documents with clients, other lawyers, and even with other persons who are assisting a lawyer in delivering legal services to clients.” (emphasis supplied).`

The opinion concludes: “A lawyer generally may transmit information relating to the representation of a client over the internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct where the lawyer has undertaken reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access. However, a lawyer may be required to take special security precautions to protect against the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of client information when required by an agreement with the client or by law, or when the nature of the information requires a higher degree of security.”  (emphasis supplied).

Bottom line:  The now revised ABA formal opinion addresses the important ethical issues related to securing client communications when transmitting confidential information over the internet under the Model Rules and is for guidance only and is not binding; however, the analysis would be applicable in most, if not all jurisdictions, including Florida.  Lawyers should consult the rules and ethics opinions of their jurisdiction for further guidance.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Leave a comment

Filed under ABA formal opinions, ABA opinion 477- communication with client over internet, Attorney Ethics, Confidentiality, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer communication over internet- confidentiality, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer ethics opinions

ABA Formal Opinion 477 addresses lawyer ethical duties when transmitting client information over the internet

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss ABA Formal Opinion 477, which was issued on May 11, 2017. The opinions addresses a lawyer’s ethical responsibilities to secure client confidential information when transmitting the information over the internet.  The Formal Opinion is here: ABA Formal Opinion 477.

ABA Formal Opinion 477 is an update opinion which specifically addresses “securing communication of protected client information” over the internet.

The Formal Opinion states:  “(i)n Formal Opinion 99-413 this Committee addressed a lawyer’s confidentiality obligations for e-mail communications with clients.  While the basic obligations of confidentiality remain applicable today, the role and risks of technology in the practice of law have evolved since 1999 prompting the need to update Opinion 99-413.  Formal Opinion 99-413 concluded: ‘Lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all forms of e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some risk of interception and disclosure. It therefore follows that its use is consistent with the duty under Rule 1.6 to use reasonable means to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to a client’s representation.’ (footnote omitted).”

“Unlike 1999 where multiple methods of communication were prevalent, today, many lawyers primarily use electronic means to communicate and exchange documents with clients, other lawyers, and even with other persons who are assisting a lawyer in delivering legal services to clients.”

The opinion concludes: “A lawyer generally may transmit information relating to the representation of a client over the internet without violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct where the lawyer has undertaken reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access. However, a lawyer may be required to take special security precautions to protect against the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of client information when required by an agreement with the client or by law, or when the nature of the information requires a higher degree of security.”

Bottom line:  This ABA opinion addresses the ethical issues related to securing client communications when transmitting confidential information over the internet under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and is for guidance only and is not binding; however, the analysis would be applicable in most, if not all jurisdictions, including Florida.  Lawyers should consult the rules and ethics opinions of their jurisdiction for further guidance.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this ethics alert is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Leave a comment

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Lawyer ethics and positional conflicts of interest

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss lawyer ethics and positional conflicts.   Although this may not be common in a typical lawyer’s practice, all lawyers should be aware of the potential ethical issues which may arise from taking opposing legal positions on behalf of 2 or more clients.

ABA Formal Opinion 93-377

ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Opinion 93-377- Positional Conflicts (issued in 1993) reviewed ethical issues when a lawyer represents one client in a matter in which the client’s interests regarding a substantive legal issue are directly adverse to a position the lawyer (or law firm) is advocating on behalf of another client on the same or similar issue.  Formal Opinion 93-377 is attached.

The opinion states that “…(a)rguing a position on behalf of one client that is adverse to a position that the lawyer, or her firm, is arguing on behalf of another current client raises a number of concerns. For example, if both cases are being argued in the same court, will the impact of the lawyer’s advocacy be diluted in the eyes of the judge(s)?  Will the first decision rendered be persuasive (or even binding) precedent with respect to the other case, thus impairing the lawyer’s effectiveness–and, if so, can the lawyer (or firm) avoid favoring one client over the other in the ‘race’ to be first? And will one or the other of the clients become concerned that the law firm it has employed may have divided loyalties?”

The opinion also reviewed the 1993 Model Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule as it existed before the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission recommended revisions to the Model Rules.  The opinion refers to paragraph (9) of the Comment to Rule 1.7 which stated as follows:

“A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.”

The opinion noted that representing two clients in different trial courts while advocating opposing sides of the same issue could also be a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 just as if both matters were pending in the same appeals court.  A decision in a trial court could influence the outcome of a second matter in another trial court, and a decision in an appeals court could have an adverse effect on a matter pending in a trial court matter.

With regard to matters pending in the same jurisdiction, the opinion stated:

“The Committee is therefore of the opinion that if the two matters are being litigated in the same jurisdiction, and there is a substantial risk that the law firm’s representation of one client will create a legal precedent, even if not binding, which is likely materially to undercut the legal position being urged on behalf of the other client, the lawyer should either refuse to accept the second representation or (if otherwise permissible) withdraw from the first, unless both clients consent after full disclosure of the potential ramifications of the lawyer continuing to handle both matters.” (footnote omitted).

If the matters are not being litigated in the same jurisdiction, the opinion provides several questions a lawyer should consider, including the relative importance of the positional conflict issue and the likelihood that it may affect the outcome of one or both of the cases, the extent to which a decision in one case might influence the decision in the other and the extent to which the lawyer ‘s independent professional judgment may be affected if he or she changes advocacy or tactics in one case to minimize any adverse effects on the client in the other case.

The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission deleted paragraph (9) to the comments to Rule 1.7, and replaced it with current paragraph (24) which states:

“Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer’s effectiveness in representing another client in a different case…Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients’ reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.”

The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also considered this issue and, in comment f §128 (2000), states that a lawyer “ordinarily may take inconsistent legal positions in different courts at different times”; however, “a conflict is presented when there is a substantial risk that a lawyer’s action in (one matter) will materially and adversely affect another client in (a second matter).”

Florida Bar Rules 

The Florida Bar has not issued an ethics opinion addressing positional conflicts; however, the Comment to Florida Bar Rule 4-1.7 is identical to the 1993 paragraph 9 of the Comment to Model Rule 1.7 and states as follows:

Conflicts in litigation 

A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate court.

State Bar Rules and Ethics Opinions 

Some state ethics opinions have considered this issue.

Oregon Ethics Opinion 2007-177 (2007) states that a lawyer may not represent a client in a matter requiring the lawyer to contend for something that he or she must contend against on behalf of another client in another matter if the outcome of one matter is highly likely to affect the outcome of the other.  The ethics opinion is here:  https://www.osbar.org/_docs/ethics/2007-177.pdf

Maine Ethics Opinion 155 (1997) – Arguing Different Sides of Same Legal Issue in Unrelated Cases addresses that state’s conflicts of interest rules in its analysis.  The ethics opinion is here:  http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=89688

“…Although we conclude that an “issue conflict” standing alone is not a conflict within the meaning of Bar Rule 3.4(b), we note that counsel has an obligation to both clients under Rule 3.6(a)(1) to employ “reasonable care and skill” and to “employ the lawyer’s best judgment” in the representation of her clients. In light of this rule, an attorney must be mindful of the possibility that contemporaneously arguing opposite sides of the same issue before the same judge or panel of judges could impair her effectiveness on behalf of both clients, thereby arguably violating Rule 3.6(a)(1). It is not possible to define all the circumstances in which this rule might be implicated, since it will depend on the particular facts and circumstances.”

The Maine Rules of Professional Conduct were revised in 2009 and that state’s version Comment to Rule 1.7 is now similar to ABA paragraph 24.

District of Columbia Ethics Opinion 265 (1996) states:  “When a lawyer is asked to represent an entity that takes positions on matters of law in a subject area in which the lawyer practices regularly on behalf of other clients, the lawyer may not, without the informed consent of all affected parties, accept simultaneous representation of both clients where such representation creates a substantial risk that representation of one client will adversely affect the representation of the other.” The ethics opinion is here:  https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion265.cfm

Bottom line:  If the lawyer is considering taking a position for one client which is directly adverse to a position the lawyer (or law firm) is taking for another client on the same or similar issue, the lawyer must consider the potential conflict of interest and act accordingly.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under ABA formal opinions, Attorney Ethics, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer conflict of interest, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer ethics opinions, Lawyer ethics positional conflicts of interest, positional conflicts

West Virginia lawyer suspended for 2 years for, inter alia, twice billing over 24 hours in one day

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent West Virginia Supreme Court opinion which suspended a lawyer for 2 years for, inter alia, billing for over 24 hours in one day on two occasions.   The case is West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Michael P. Cooke, SC No. 15-1243 April 20, 2017).  The Supreme Court’s opinion is here:  http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/docs/spring2017/15-1243.pdf

According to the opinion, “during the time period of January 21, 2014, through September 18, 2014, Cooke billed more than fifteen hours a day on thirty-seven different days. On five of those days, he billed in excess of twenty hours and on two of those days, he billed greater than twenty-four hours. Cooke maintains that during that period of time he was billing the time of the contract attorneys working for him, as well as his own.  However, per Cooke’s own testimony, this would have occurred for only some portion of the time period at issue inasmuch as his ‘full-time’ contract attorney quit in late-March, leaving only the part-time contract attorney, who likewise quit at some point later that year.”

“Moreover, during this time period, Cooke contends that he was suffering from diagnosed ‘low testosterone’ which caused him to sleep between ten and sixteen hours a day; medical records introduced into evidence do in fact support such a diagnosis in June, 2014. Cooke maintains that this fatigue continued throughout the time frame in which the guardian ad litem matter was ‘pending’ and continued until November, 2014.”

“Cooke’s extraordinary overbilling was not only intentional and pervasive within the time period at issue, but long-standing. Given the state of the public fisc, the actual injury to the taxpayers of the State of West Virginia is all too real. As the Supreme Court of Ohio stated, overbilling the state for representing indigent clients ‘exploit[s] an already overburdened system designed to aid the poorest members of our society and lessen[s] public confidence in the legal profession and compromise[s] its integrity.’ Holland, 835 N.E.2d at 366. Cooke’s misconduct in that regard, therefore, profoundly affects the public, the legal system, and the profession.

“Moreover, while the bulk of the foregoing discussion has been dedicated to Cooke’s overbilling to PDS, by no means does this Court intend to minimize the seriousness of Cooke’s other violations. In particular, Cooke’s failure to timely file a guardian ad litem brief with this Court in an abuse and neglect matter is not only violative of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but in complete disregard of the countless warnings issued by this Court regarding the appellate obligations of guardians ad litem…”

“Therefore, giving Cooke the benefit of every doubt, this purported fatigue and reduced working capacity would have existed from approximately February until November, 2014—the exact time period under scrutiny for overbilling. Per Cooke’s own testimony, therefore, during this time there would have been between only eight and fourteen hours of the day in which he could even be awake to perform work.”

After summarizing West Virginia cases and standards, the opinion stated the following:

“In view of the foregoing, we find that Cooke’s misconduct warrants a two-year suspension from the practice of law. Cooke’s defrauding of the State through overbilling, gross mishandling of a client matter and funds, his dereliction of duty to his infant clients as a guardian ad litem—all of which is compounded by his unrelenting pattern of unresponsiveness and empty reassurances of remediation—plainly justify this degree of discipline.”  The disciplinary hearing panel had recommended a three month suspension and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel recommended a suspension of 18 months.

Bottom line: This lawyer was found to have engaged in serious and excessive overbilling and the opinion found that the overbilling was “intentional and pervasive”.  Among other things, he claimed in mitigation that he had low testosterone “which caused him to sleep between ten and sixteen hours a day.”   The lawyer was suspended for 2 years for this serious misconduct.

Be careful out there.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under and fraud, Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Attorney misrepresentation, deceit, dishonesty, Excessive fee, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, lawyer excessive fee, Lawyer excessive fees, Lawyer false statements, Lawyer overbilling excessive fees

Florida Supreme Court finds that attorney-client privilege prohibits inquiries into lawyer/doctor referral relationships

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the important very recent Florida Supreme Court opinion which prohibit inquiries by defense counsel into referral relationships between the plaintiff’s law firm and a physician.  The case is Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., No. SC15-1086 (Fla. SC April 13, 2017).  The Florida Supreme Court opinion is here:  http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2017/sc15-1086.pdf

The Florida Supreme Court considered the case because of a certified conflict under art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. in the opinions of the Fifth District Court of Appeal (in this case) and the Second District Court of Appeal (in Burt v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

According to the opinion, Heather Worley was a plaintiff in a lawsuit against YMCA after she allegedly fell in a Florida YMCA parking lot.  Worley was represented by Morgan & Morgan.  At Worley’s depositions, YMCA’s lawyer asked if she was referred to her specialists by her attorneys and Worley’s lawyer objected on the ground that the information was attorney-client privileged.

YMCA then served interrogatories directed to specific doctors employed by three medical providers with whom Worley treated and also served a supplemental request to produce to Morgan & Morgan, to attempt to establish the existence of a referral relationship between Morgan & Morgan and the treating physicians.  The opinion states that “(t)hese efforts were based on YMCA’s suspicions that there was a ‘cozy agreement’ between Morgan & Morgan and the physicians, due to the amounts of Worley’s medical bills.”

Worley objected (through Morgan & Morgan) and stated that the discovery requests were “overbroad, vague, unduly and financially burdensome, irrelevant and in violation [of] allowable discovery pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4).”  She also contended that Morgan & Morgan does not maintain “information for treating physicians as in this matter, or otherwise.”

At a hearing on Worley’s objections, “the trial court only sustained Worley’s objection to the question regarding whether she was referred to the doctors by her attorneys and ‘did not address Worley’s objections to YMCA’s other outstanding discovery requests at that time.’”  The Fifth DCA upheld the lower court’s order and relied on Florida district court decisions which held that the financial relationship between a law firm and a plaintiff’s treating physician is discoverable if evidence of a referral relationship can be shown.  Those cases relied upon the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boecher, 733 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1999).

In its 4-3 decision, the Court rejected the application of Boecher and found that the defense attorneys were prohibited from inquiring about the referral relationships between plaintiff’s firm, Morgan & Morgan, and Sea Spine Orthopedic Institute stating that “(a)llowing further discovery into a possible relationship between the physician and the plaintiff’s law firm would only serve to uncover evidence that, even if relevant, would require the production of communications and materials that are protected by attorney-client privilege.”  “We do not agree with the Fifth District’s attempt to circumvent the attorney-client privilege out of perceived necessity. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest confidential communication privilege known in the common law.”

“Even in cases where a plaintiff’s medical bills appear to be inflated for the purposes of litigation, we do not believe that engaging in costly and time-consuming discovery to uncover a “cozy agreement” between the law firm and a treating physician is the appropriate response. We are concerned that this type of discovery would have a chilling effect on doctors who may refuse to treat patients who could end up in litigation out of fear of becoming embroiled in the litigation themselves. Moreover, we worry that discovery orders such as the one in this case will inflate the costs of litigation to the point that some plaintiffs will be denied access to the courts, as attorneys will no longer be willing to advance these types of costs. Finally, attempting to discover this information requires the disclosure of materials that would otherwise be protected under the attorney-client privilege.”

The Supreme Court opinion quashed Fifth DCA’s decision permitting the discovery and approved the decision of the Second DCA.

Bottom line: This case is important since it addresses and appears to settle the question of whether the defense in a personal injury case (or any case) can use discovery to attempt to determine if there is a “cozy” relationship between the plaintiff’s law firm and treating medical providers.  The opinion found that the information sought was protected by the attorney/client privilege, §90.502(2), Fla. Stat., and that the discovery was prohibited.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under .S. Supreme Court, attorney/client privilege, Attorney/client privilege and confidentiality, Attorney/client privilege discovery of referral relationships with doctors, Confidentiality and privilege, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer ethics duties re subpoena for client confidential documents and information, prohibition of inquiries into lawyer/doctor referrals

New Jersey lawyer receives censure for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and fraud and dishonesty

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent New Jersey Supreme Court Order which adopted the findings of the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board and censured a lawyer for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and engaging in conduct involving fraud or dishonesty.  The case is In The Matter of John R. Dusinberre, D-37 September Term 2015 078531 (Supreme Court of New Jersey April 5, 2017).  The New Jersey Supreme Court Order is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1082216 and the Disciplinary Board (DRB) Decision dated November 9, 2016 is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1077667

According to the DRB Decision, the lawyer was charged with violating Bar rules in four separate matters:

“In the first matter, respondent represented Anthony Domenick and 407-409 Summer Associates, LLC for a Paterson condominium development known as ‘Sandy Hill at Summer Street.’ The terms of the representation called for respondent to file a public offering statement (POS) with the New Jersey Division of Community Affairs (DCA) and to record a master deed in the county clerk’s office. Respondent told his client that he had filed the POS with the DCA and furnished him with a copy of a November 12, 2007 POS carrying registration number ‘04368.’ Respondent stipulated that he never filed a POS with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated the POS and created a fictitious registration number; the DCA had never assigned a registration number to the Sandy Hill project. Although respondent also failed to record the master deed, he either informed his client, or led him to believe, that he had done so.

“In a second matter, respondent represented a client identified only as ‘Mr. Cerquirra’ and ‘88 St. Francis LLC’ regarding a condominium development project at 88 St. Francis Street in Newark. The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA and to obtain a registration order. Respondent informed the client that he had obtained a registration order for the project from the DCA. He also gave the client an October 27, 2008 letter, purportedly from DCA’s Manager of the Planned Real Estate Department, Stewart P. Pallonis. Enclosed with that letter was an order of registration from the DCA carrying registration number 04487, and signed ‘Stewart P. Pallonis.’  In fact, respondent never registered the 88 St. Francis Street project with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated both the Pallonis letter and the registration order, signing Pallonis’ name to both documents before giving them to the client.

“In a third matter, respondent represented Sterling Properties (Sterling) for a Cedar Knolls condominium project known as ‘Viera at Hanover.’ The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA, but he failed to do so. Respondent, nevertheless, led Sterling to believe that he had registered the project with the DCA, knowing that he had not done so. In reliance on respondent’s false information, Sterling went forward with the project.

“In a fourth matter, respondent represented Sterling for another condominium project in Piscataway. That representation, too, required respondent to register the project with the DCA. Again, respondent failed to do so. Respondent led Sterling to believe that the Piscataway project, too, was registered with the DCA, knowing that it was not. Relying on respondent’s statements, Sterling proceeded with the development project.”

“During respondent’s entire thirty-four-year career at MSLD, he reported to Barry Mandelbaum, the managing attorney, and twelve years his senior. Respondent described Mandelbaum as a “benevolent despot” and a “mentor.” Respondent was never “encouraged” to generate business for the firm. Rather, he tended to work on legal matters that Mandelbaum generated.

“Respondent described his relationship with Mandelbaum as a stressful one. Mandelbaum would berate respondent publicly, place notes on respondent’s door about perceived failings, and subject him to ‘105 decibel,’ public ‘dress downs,’ all of which were extremely embarrassing.

“As the law firm grew larger, younger attorneys became partners. By the mid-2000s, some of those partners had come to expect respondent to complete work on projects that they had generated, placing additional pressure on respondent to perform.

“Several years before respondent engaged in the within misconduct, MSLD established an executive committee to manage the law firm. Respondent perceived that the new arrangement rewarded some of the younger, income-generating attorneys, at his expense. Feeling exposed, he became “terrified” about losing his job. At that juncture, he grew even more reliant on Mandelbaum for protection:

So my desire and drive to please him became extremely strong. And I can’t tell you the number of times when I would have an issue with a client, I would hear the client five minutes later on the phone with Barry and then I would hear Barry’s footsteps stomping down the hall to basically dress me down or yell at me and to confront me, or whatever it might be very publicly.

And it was extremely upsetting and got to the point where I went from a lawyer who loved to go to work every day to a lawyer who dreaded pulling into the parking lot of my law firm, counting whose cars were in to try and decide whose work I should be doing that day so that I wouldn’t get yelled at or — or, you know, almost — I almost use the word bullied, although I’m an adult and was an adult at the time, and it’s a hard concept to have, but it’s the desperate situation I found myself in. (T20-10 to T21-2.)

“Worried about being ‘kicked out’ of MSLD, respondent felt tremendous pressure to complete tasks on time, according to schedules that other attorneys prepared for him. Also pressing was the fear that, because he was over sixty years old and had never been in another legal setting, he could not strike out on his own.”

The DRB Decision also found that the lawyer had no prior discipline, expressed remorse for his misconduct, and paid former clients, the firm and the DCA hundreds of thousands of dollars as restitution.  The DRB recommended a censure (which is a stronger sanction than a reprimand in New Jersey).  The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted that sanction and censured the lawyer.

Bottom line:  This case is unusual, to say the least.  Although the lawyer provided significant mitigation (including the serious “berating” by a supervising partner and “cracking under the pressure” of the partner’s criticism), his underlying misconduct, including his multiple false statements to clients, neglecting client matters and failing to communicate, would appear to be serious enough to merit a suspension, notwithstanding the mitigation that he provided.  The lawyer was in his 50’s and 60’s when the misconduct occurred. One could certainly conclude that the lawyer’s testimony about the “pressure” of the practice was somewhat of an excuse and not an explanation.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

 

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