Monthly Archives: April 2017

West Virginia lawyer suspended for 2 years for, inter alia, twice billing over 24 hours in one day

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent West Virginia Supreme Court opinion which suspended a lawyer for 2 years for, inter alia, billing for over 24 hours in one day on two occasions.   The case is West Virginia Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Michael P. Cooke, SC No. 15-1243 April 20, 2017).  The Supreme Court’s opinion is here:  http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/docs/spring2017/15-1243.pdf

According to the opinion, “during the time period of January 21, 2014, through September 18, 2014, Cooke billed more than fifteen hours a day on thirty-seven different days. On five of those days, he billed in excess of twenty hours and on two of those days, he billed greater than twenty-four hours. Cooke maintains that during that period of time he was billing the time of the contract attorneys working for him, as well as his own.  However, per Cooke’s own testimony, this would have occurred for only some portion of the time period at issue inasmuch as his ‘full-time’ contract attorney quit in late-March, leaving only the part-time contract attorney, who likewise quit at some point later that year.”

“Moreover, during this time period, Cooke contends that he was suffering from diagnosed ‘low testosterone’ which caused him to sleep between ten and sixteen hours a day; medical records introduced into evidence do in fact support such a diagnosis in June, 2014. Cooke maintains that this fatigue continued throughout the time frame in which the guardian ad litem matter was ‘pending’ and continued until November, 2014.”

“Cooke’s extraordinary overbilling was not only intentional and pervasive within the time period at issue, but long-standing. Given the state of the public fisc, the actual injury to the taxpayers of the State of West Virginia is all too real. As the Supreme Court of Ohio stated, overbilling the state for representing indigent clients ‘exploit[s] an already overburdened system designed to aid the poorest members of our society and lessen[s] public confidence in the legal profession and compromise[s] its integrity.’ Holland, 835 N.E.2d at 366. Cooke’s misconduct in that regard, therefore, profoundly affects the public, the legal system, and the profession.

“Moreover, while the bulk of the foregoing discussion has been dedicated to Cooke’s overbilling to PDS, by no means does this Court intend to minimize the seriousness of Cooke’s other violations. In particular, Cooke’s failure to timely file a guardian ad litem brief with this Court in an abuse and neglect matter is not only violative of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but in complete disregard of the countless warnings issued by this Court regarding the appellate obligations of guardians ad litem…”

“Therefore, giving Cooke the benefit of every doubt, this purported fatigue and reduced working capacity would have existed from approximately February until November, 2014—the exact time period under scrutiny for overbilling. Per Cooke’s own testimony, therefore, during this time there would have been between only eight and fourteen hours of the day in which he could even be awake to perform work.”

After summarizing West Virginia cases and standards, the opinion stated the following:

“In view of the foregoing, we find that Cooke’s misconduct warrants a two-year suspension from the practice of law. Cooke’s defrauding of the State through overbilling, gross mishandling of a client matter and funds, his dereliction of duty to his infant clients as a guardian ad litem—all of which is compounded by his unrelenting pattern of unresponsiveness and empty reassurances of remediation—plainly justify this degree of discipline.”  The disciplinary hearing panel had recommended a three month suspension and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel recommended a suspension of 18 months.

Bottom line: This lawyer was found to have engaged in serious and excessive overbilling and the opinion found that the overbilling was “intentional and pervasive”.  Among other things, he claimed in mitigation that he had low testosterone “which caused him to sleep between ten and sixteen hours a day.”   The lawyer was suspended for 2 years for this serious misconduct.

Be careful out there.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under and fraud, Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Attorney misrepresentation, deceit, dishonesty, Excessive fee, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, lawyer excessive fee, Lawyer excessive fees, Lawyer false statements, Lawyer overbilling excessive fees

U.S. Supreme Court holds that bad faith fee sanction under court’s inherent authority is limited to fees incurred solely from the misconduct

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the important and very recent United States Supreme Court opinion which held that a bad faith fee sanction based upon a court’s inherent authority is limited to fees incurred solely as a result of the misconduct.  The case is Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., v. Haeger, 813 F. 3d 1233, No. 15–1406 (Argued January 10, 2017—Decided April 18, 2017).  The United  States Supreme Court opinion is here:  https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1406_db8e.pdf

According to the opinion, which was delivered by Justice Kagan, the Haegers sued Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, alleging that the failure of a Goodyear G159 tire caused the family’s motorhome to swerve off the road and flip over.  “After several years of contentious discovery, marked by Goodyear’s slow response to repeated requests for internal G159 test results, the parties settled the case. Some months later, the Haegers’ lawyer learned that, in another lawsuit involving the G159, Goodyear had disclosed test results indicating that the tire got unusually hot at highway speeds. In subsequent correspondence, Goodyear conceded withholding the information from the Haegers, even though they had requested all testing data. The Haegers then sought sanctions for discovery fraud, urging that Goodyear’s misconduct entitled them to attorney’s fees and costs expended in the litigation.

“The District Court found that Goodyear had engaged in an extended course of misconduct. Exercising its inherent power to sanction bad-faith behavior, the court awarded the Haegers $2.7 million—the entire sum they had spent in legal fees and costs since the moment, early in the litigation, when Goodyear made its first dishonest discovery response. The court said that in the usual case, sanctions ordered pursuant to a court’s inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct must be limited to the amount of legal fees caused by that misconduct. But it determined that in cases of particularly egregious behavior, a court can award a party all of the attorney’s fees incurred in a case, without any need to find a “causal link between [the expenses and] the sanctionable conduct.” (citation omitted)

“As further support for its award, the District Court concluded that full and timely disclosure of the test results would likely have led Goodyear to settle the case much earlier. Acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit might require a link between the misconduct and the harm caused, however, the court also made a contingent award of $2 million. That smaller amount, designed to take effect if the Ninth Circuit reversed the larger award, deducted $700,000 in fees the Haegers incurred in developing claims against other defendants and proving their own medical damages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the full $2.7 million award, concluding that the District Court had properly awarded the Haegers all the fees they incurred during the time when Goodyear was acting in bad faith.

Goodyear argued that, due to the failure of the court to link the fee with the misconduct, the fee award should be reversed and an instruction to the trial court to reconsider the matter. The Haegers argued that the award should be upheld because the lower courts articulated and applied the appropriate but-for causation standard, or, even if they did not, the fee award in fact passes the but-for test.

“The Haegers’ defense of the lower courts’ reasoning is a non-starter: Neither court used the correct legal standard. The District Court specifically disclaimed the need for a causal link on the ground that this was a “truly egregious” case. 906 F. Supp. 2d, at 975. And the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court could grant all attorney’s fees incurred “during the time when [Goodyear was] acting in bad faith,” 813 F. 3d 1233, 1249—a temporal, not causal, limitation. A sanctioning court must determine which fees were incurred because of, and solely because of, the misconduct at issue, and no such finding lies behind the $2.7 million award made and affirmed below. Nor is this Court inclined to fill in the gap, as the Haegers urge. As an initial matter, the Haegers have not shown that this litigation would have settled as soon as Goodyear divulged the heat-test results (a showing that would justify an all-fees award from the moment Goodyear was supposed to disclose). Further, they cannot demonstrate that Goodyear’s non-disclosure so permeated the suit as to make that misconduct a but-for cause of every subsequent legal expense, totaling the full $2.7 million.”

“Although the District Court considered causation in arriving at its back-up award of $2 million, it is unclear whether its understanding of that requirement corresponds to the appropriate standard—an uncertainty pointing toward throwing out the fee award and instructing the trial court to consider the matter anew. However, the Haegers contend that Goodyear has waived any ability to challenge the contingent award since the $2 million sum reflects Goodyear’s own submission that only about $700,000 of the fees sought would have been incurred regardless of the company’s behavior. The Court of Appeals did not address that issue, and this Court declines to decide it in the first instance. The possibility of waiver should therefore be the initial order of business on remand.”

The opinion held that “(w)hen a federal court exercises its inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct by ordering a litigant to pay the other side’s legal fees, the award is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct—or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith.”  The case was reversed and remanded.

Bottom line: This U.S. Supreme Court opinion is important since it addresses and resolves (at least in the federal courts) the question of whether a court exercising its inherent authority to sanction bad faith misconduct by awarding fees must limit the fees to those incurred as a direct result of the lawyer’s misconduct.  The opinion found in the affirmative and that the fees awarded must be shown to have been incurred solely as a result of the misconduct.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Leave a comment

Filed under .S. Supreme Court, Attorney Ethics, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer sanctions, U.S. Supreme Court

U.S. Supreme Court holds that bad faith fee sanction under court’s inherent authority is limited to fees incurred solely from the misconduct

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the important and very recent United States Supreme Court opinion which held that a bad faith fee sanction based upon a court’s inherent authority is limited to fees incurred solely as a result of the misconduct.  The case is Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., v. Haeger, 813 F. 3d 1233, No. 15–1406 (Argued January 10, 2017—Decided April 18, 2017).  The United States Supreme Court opinion is here:  https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1406_db8e.pdf

According to the opinion, which was delivered by Justice Kagan, the Haegers sued Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, alleging that the failure of a Goodyear G159 tire caused the family’s motorhome to swerve off the road and flip over.  “After several years of contentious discovery, marked by Goodyear’s slow response to repeated requests for internal G159 test results, the parties settled the case. Some months later, the Haegers’ lawyer learned that, in another lawsuit involving the G159, Goodyear had disclosed test results indicating that the tire got unusually hot at highway speeds. In subsequent correspondence, Goodyear conceded withholding the information from the Haegers, even though they had requested all testing data. The Haegers then sought sanctions for discovery fraud, urging that Goodyear’s misconduct entitled them to attorney’s fees and costs expended in the litigation.

“The District Court found that Goodyear had engaged in an extended course of misconduct. Exercising its inherent power to sanction bad-faith behavior, the court awarded the Haegers $2.7 million—the entire sum they had spent in legal fees and costs since the moment, early in the litigation, when Goodyear made its first dishonest discovery response. The court said that in the usual case, sanctions ordered pursuant to a court’s inherent power to sanction litigation misconduct must be limited to the amount of legal fees caused by that misconduct. But it determined that in cases of particularly egregious behavior, a court can award a party all of the attorney’s fees incurred in a case, without any need to find a “causal link between [the expenses and] the sanctionable conduct.” (citation omitted)

“As further support for its award, the District Court concluded that full and timely disclosure of the test results would likely have led Goodyear to settle the case much earlier. Acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit might require a link between the misconduct and the harm caused, however, the court also made a contingent award of $2 million. That smaller amount, designed to take effect if the Ninth Circuit reversed the larger award, deducted $700,000 in fees the Haegers incurred in developing claims against other defendants and proving their own medical damages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the full $2.7 million award, concluding that the District Court had properly awarded the Haegers all the fees they incurred during the time when Goodyear was acting in bad faith.

Goodyear argued that, due to the failure of the court to link the fee with the misconduct, the fee award should be reversed and an instruction to the trial court to reconsider the matter. The Haegers argued that the award should be upheld because the lower courts articulated and applied the appropriate but-for causation standard, or, even if they did not, the fee award in fact passes the but-for test.

“The Haegers’ defense of the lower courts’ reasoning is a non-starter: Neither court used the correct legal standard. The District Court specifically disclaimed the need for a causal link on the ground that this was a “truly egregious” case. 906 F. Supp. 2d, at 975. And the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court could grant all attorney’s fees incurred “during the time when [Goodyear was] acting in bad faith,” 813 F. 3d 1233, 1249—a temporal, not causal, limitation. A sanctioning court must determine which fees were incurred because of, and solely because of, the misconduct at issue, and no such finding lies behind the $2.7 million award made and affirmed below. Nor is this Court inclined to fill in the gap, as the Haegers urge. As an initial matter, the Haegers have not shown that this litigation would have settled as soon as Goodyear divulged the heat-test results (a showing that would justify an all-fees award from the moment Goodyear was supposed to disclose). Further, they cannot demonstrate that Goodyear’s non-disclosure so permeated the suit as to make that misconduct a but-for cause of every subsequent legal expense, totaling the full $2.7 million.”

“Although the District Court considered causation in arriving at its back-up award of $2 million, it is unclear whether its understanding of that requirement corresponds to the appropriate standard—an uncertainty pointing toward throwing out the fee award and instructing the trial court to consider the matter anew. However, the Haegers contend that Goodyear has waived any ability to challenge the contingent award since the $2 million sum reflects Goodyear’s own submission that only about $700,000 of the fees sought would have been incurred regardless of the company’s behavior. The Court of Appeals did not address that issue, and this Court declines to decide it in the first instance. The possibility of waiver should therefore be the initial order of business on remand.”

The opinion held that “(w)hen a federal court exercises its inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct by ordering a litigant to pay the other side’s legal fees, the award is limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct—or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith.”  The case was reversed and remanded.

Bottom line: This U.S. Supreme Court opinion is important since it addresses and resolves (at least in the federal courts) the question of whether a court exercising its inherent authority to sanction bad faith misconduct by awarding fees must limit the fees to those incurred as a direct result of the lawyer’s misconduct.  The opinion found in the affirmative and that the fees awarded must be shown to have been incurred solely as a result of the misconduct.

Be careful out there.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Leave a comment

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Florida Supreme Court finds that attorney-client privilege prohibits inquiries into lawyer/doctor referral relationships

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the important very recent Florida Supreme Court opinion which prohibit inquiries by defense counsel into referral relationships between the plaintiff’s law firm and a physician.  The case is Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., No. SC15-1086 (Fla. SC April 13, 2017).  The Florida Supreme Court opinion is here:  http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2017/sc15-1086.pdf

The Florida Supreme Court considered the case because of a certified conflict under art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. in the opinions of the Fifth District Court of Appeal (in this case) and the Second District Court of Appeal (in Burt v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 603 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

According to the opinion, Heather Worley was a plaintiff in a lawsuit against YMCA after she allegedly fell in a Florida YMCA parking lot.  Worley was represented by Morgan & Morgan.  At Worley’s depositions, YMCA’s lawyer asked if she was referred to her specialists by her attorneys and Worley’s lawyer objected on the ground that the information was attorney-client privileged.

YMCA then served interrogatories directed to specific doctors employed by three medical providers with whom Worley treated and also served a supplemental request to produce to Morgan & Morgan, to attempt to establish the existence of a referral relationship between Morgan & Morgan and the treating physicians.  The opinion states that “(t)hese efforts were based on YMCA’s suspicions that there was a ‘cozy agreement’ between Morgan & Morgan and the physicians, due to the amounts of Worley’s medical bills.”

Worley objected (through Morgan & Morgan) and stated that the discovery requests were “overbroad, vague, unduly and financially burdensome, irrelevant and in violation [of] allowable discovery pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4).”  She also contended that Morgan & Morgan does not maintain “information for treating physicians as in this matter, or otherwise.”

At a hearing on Worley’s objections, “the trial court only sustained Worley’s objection to the question regarding whether she was referred to the doctors by her attorneys and ‘did not address Worley’s objections to YMCA’s other outstanding discovery requests at that time.’”  The Fifth DCA upheld the lower court’s order and relied on Florida district court decisions which held that the financial relationship between a law firm and a plaintiff’s treating physician is discoverable if evidence of a referral relationship can be shown.  Those cases relied upon the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boecher, 733 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1999).

In its 4-3 decision, the Court rejected the application of Boecher and found that the defense attorneys were prohibited from inquiring about the referral relationships between plaintiff’s firm, Morgan & Morgan, and Sea Spine Orthopedic Institute stating that “(a)llowing further discovery into a possible relationship between the physician and the plaintiff’s law firm would only serve to uncover evidence that, even if relevant, would require the production of communications and materials that are protected by attorney-client privilege.”  “We do not agree with the Fifth District’s attempt to circumvent the attorney-client privilege out of perceived necessity. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest confidential communication privilege known in the common law.”

“Even in cases where a plaintiff’s medical bills appear to be inflated for the purposes of litigation, we do not believe that engaging in costly and time-consuming discovery to uncover a “cozy agreement” between the law firm and a treating physician is the appropriate response. We are concerned that this type of discovery would have a chilling effect on doctors who may refuse to treat patients who could end up in litigation out of fear of becoming embroiled in the litigation themselves. Moreover, we worry that discovery orders such as the one in this case will inflate the costs of litigation to the point that some plaintiffs will be denied access to the courts, as attorneys will no longer be willing to advance these types of costs. Finally, attempting to discover this information requires the disclosure of materials that would otherwise be protected under the attorney-client privilege.”

The Supreme Court opinion quashed Fifth DCA’s decision permitting the discovery and approved the decision of the Second DCA.

Bottom line: This case is important since it addresses and appears to settle the question of whether the defense in a personal injury case (or any case) can use discovery to attempt to determine if there is a “cozy” relationship between the plaintiff’s law firm and treating medical providers.  The opinion found that the information sought was protected by the attorney/client privilege, §90.502(2), Fla. Stat., and that the discovery was prohibited.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under .S. Supreme Court, attorney/client privilege, Attorney/client privilege and confidentiality, Attorney/client privilege discovery of referral relationships with doctors, Confidentiality and privilege, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer ethics duties re subpoena for client confidential documents and information, prohibition of inquiries into lawyer/doctor referrals

New Jersey lawyer receives censure for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and fraud and dishonesty

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent New Jersey Supreme Court Order which adopted the findings of the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board and censured a lawyer for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and engaging in conduct involving fraud or dishonesty.  The case is In The Matter of John R. Dusinberre, D-37 September Term 2015 078531 (Supreme Court of New Jersey April 5, 2017).  The New Jersey Supreme Court Order is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1082216 and the Disciplinary Board (DRB) Decision dated November 9, 2016 is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1077667

According to the DRB Decision, the lawyer was charged with violating Bar rules in four separate matters:

“In the first matter, respondent represented Anthony Domenick and 407-409 Summer Associates, LLC for a Paterson condominium development known as ‘Sandy Hill at Summer Street.’ The terms of the representation called for respondent to file a public offering statement (POS) with the New Jersey Division of Community Affairs (DCA) and to record a master deed in the county clerk’s office. Respondent told his client that he had filed the POS with the DCA and furnished him with a copy of a November 12, 2007 POS carrying registration number ‘04368.’ Respondent stipulated that he never filed a POS with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated the POS and created a fictitious registration number; the DCA had never assigned a registration number to the Sandy Hill project. Although respondent also failed to record the master deed, he either informed his client, or led him to believe, that he had done so.

“In a second matter, respondent represented a client identified only as ‘Mr. Cerquirra’ and ‘88 St. Francis LLC’ regarding a condominium development project at 88 St. Francis Street in Newark. The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA and to obtain a registration order. Respondent informed the client that he had obtained a registration order for the project from the DCA. He also gave the client an October 27, 2008 letter, purportedly from DCA’s Manager of the Planned Real Estate Department, Stewart P. Pallonis. Enclosed with that letter was an order of registration from the DCA carrying registration number 04487, and signed ‘Stewart P. Pallonis.’  In fact, respondent never registered the 88 St. Francis Street project with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated both the Pallonis letter and the registration order, signing Pallonis’ name to both documents before giving them to the client.

“In a third matter, respondent represented Sterling Properties (Sterling) for a Cedar Knolls condominium project known as ‘Viera at Hanover.’ The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA, but he failed to do so. Respondent, nevertheless, led Sterling to believe that he had registered the project with the DCA, knowing that he had not done so. In reliance on respondent’s false information, Sterling went forward with the project.

“In a fourth matter, respondent represented Sterling for another condominium project in Piscataway. That representation, too, required respondent to register the project with the DCA. Again, respondent failed to do so. Respondent led Sterling to believe that the Piscataway project, too, was registered with the DCA, knowing that it was not. Relying on respondent’s statements, Sterling proceeded with the development project.”

“During respondent’s entire thirty-four-year career at MSLD, he reported to Barry Mandelbaum, the managing attorney, and twelve years his senior. Respondent described Mandelbaum as a “benevolent despot” and a “mentor.” Respondent was never “encouraged” to generate business for the firm. Rather, he tended to work on legal matters that Mandelbaum generated.

“Respondent described his relationship with Mandelbaum as a stressful one. Mandelbaum would berate respondent publicly, place notes on respondent’s door about perceived failings, and subject him to ‘105 decibel,’ public ‘dress downs,’ all of which were extremely embarrassing.

“As the law firm grew larger, younger attorneys became partners. By the mid-2000s, some of those partners had come to expect respondent to complete work on projects that they had generated, placing additional pressure on respondent to perform.

“Several years before respondent engaged in the within misconduct, MSLD established an executive committee to manage the law firm. Respondent perceived that the new arrangement rewarded some of the younger, income-generating attorneys, at his expense. Feeling exposed, he became “terrified” about losing his job. At that juncture, he grew even more reliant on Mandelbaum for protection:

So my desire and drive to please him became extremely strong. And I can’t tell you the number of times when I would have an issue with a client, I would hear the client five minutes later on the phone with Barry and then I would hear Barry’s footsteps stomping down the hall to basically dress me down or yell at me and to confront me, or whatever it might be very publicly.

And it was extremely upsetting and got to the point where I went from a lawyer who loved to go to work every day to a lawyer who dreaded pulling into the parking lot of my law firm, counting whose cars were in to try and decide whose work I should be doing that day so that I wouldn’t get yelled at or — or, you know, almost — I almost use the word bullied, although I’m an adult and was an adult at the time, and it’s a hard concept to have, but it’s the desperate situation I found myself in. (T20-10 to T21-2.)

“Worried about being ‘kicked out’ of MSLD, respondent felt tremendous pressure to complete tasks on time, according to schedules that other attorneys prepared for him. Also pressing was the fear that, because he was over sixty years old and had never been in another legal setting, he could not strike out on his own.”

The DRB Decision also found that the lawyer had no prior discipline, expressed remorse for his misconduct, and paid former clients, the firm and the DCA hundreds of thousands of dollars as restitution.  The DRB recommended a censure (which is a stronger sanction than a reprimand in New Jersey).  The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted that sanction and censured the lawyer.

Bottom line:  This case is unusual, to say the least.  Although the lawyer provided significant mitigation (including the serious “berating” by a supervising partner and “cracking under the pressure” of the partner’s criticism), his underlying misconduct, including his multiple false statements to clients, neglecting client matters and failing to communicate, would appear to be serious enough to merit a suspension, notwithstanding the mitigation that he provided.  The lawyer was in his 50’s and 60’s when the misconduct occurred. One could certainly conclude that the lawyer’s testimony about the “pressure” of the practice was somewhat of an excuse and not an explanation.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

Leave a comment

Filed under Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Attorney misrepresentation, Communication with clients, deceit, dishonesty, fraud, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer false statements, Lawyer false statements to clients, Lawyer lack of communication with client, Lawyer lack of diligence, Lawyer lying to clients, Lawyer misrepresentation, Lawyer sanctions, Uncategorized

New Jersey lawyer receives censure for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and fraud and dishonesty

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent New Jersey Supreme Court Order which adopted the findings of the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board and censured a lawyer for neglecting client matters, failing to communicate with clients, and engaging in conduct involving fraud or dishonesty.  The case is In The Matter of John R. Dusinberre, D-37 September Term 2015 078531 (Supreme Court of New Jersey April 5, 2017).  The New Jersey Supreme Court Order is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1082216 and the Disciplinary Board (DRB) Decision dated November 9, 2016 is here:  http://drblookupportal.judiciary.state.nj.us/DocumentHandler.ashx?document_id=1077667

According to the DRB Decision, the lawyer was charged with violating Bar rules in four separate matters:

“In the first matter, respondent represented Anthony Domenick and 407-409 Summer Associates, LLC for a Paterson condominium development known as ‘Sandy Hill at Summer Street.’ The terms of the representation called for respondent to file a public offering statement (POS) with the New Jersey Division of Community Affairs (DCA) and to record a master deed in the county clerk’s office. Respondent told his client that he had filed the POS with the DCA and furnished him with a copy of a November 12, 2007 POS carrying registration number ‘04368.’ Respondent stipulated that he never filed a POS with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated the POS and created a fictitious registration number; the DCA had never assigned a registration number to the Sandy Hill project. Although respondent also failed to record the master deed, he either informed his client, or led him to believe, that he had done so.

“In a second matter, respondent represented a client identified only as ‘Mr. Cerquirra’ and ‘88 St. Francis LLC’ regarding a condominium development project at 88 St. Francis Street in Newark. The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA and to obtain a registration order. Respondent informed the client that he had obtained a registration order for the project from the DCA. He also gave the client an October 27, 2008 letter, purportedly from DCA’s Manager of the Planned Real Estate Department, Stewart P. Pallonis. Enclosed with that letter was an order of registration from the DCA carrying registration number 04487, and signed ‘Stewart P. Pallonis.’  In fact, respondent never registered the 88 St. Francis Street project with the DCA. Rather, he had fabricated both the Pallonis letter and the registration order, signing Pallonis’ name to both documents before giving them to the client.

“In a third matter, respondent represented Sterling Properties (Sterling) for a Cedar Knolls condominium project known as ‘Viera at Hanover.’ The representation required respondent to register the project with the DCA, but he failed to do so. Respondent, nevertheless, led Sterling to believe that he had registered the project with the DCA, knowing that he had not done so. In reliance on respondent’s false information, Sterling went forward with the project.

“In a fourth matter, respondent represented Sterling for another condominium project in Piscataway. That representation, too, required respondent to register the project with the DCA. Again, respondent failed to do so. Respondent led Sterling to believe that the Piscataway project, too, was registered with the DCA, knowing that it was not. Relying on respondent’s statements, Sterling proceeded with the development project.”

“During respondent’s entire thirty-four-year career at MSLD, he reported to Barry Mandelbaum, the managing attorney, and twelve years his senior. Respondent described Mandelbaum as a “benevolent despot” and a “mentor.” Respondent was never “encouraged” to generate business for the firm. Rather, he tended to work on legal matters that Mandelbaum generated.

“Respondent described his relationship with Mandelbaum as a stressful one. Mandelbaum would berate respondent publicly, place notes on respondent’s door about perceived failings, and subject him to ‘105 decibel,’ public ‘dress downs,’ all of which were extremely embarrassing.

“As the law firm grew larger, younger attorneys became partners. By the mid-2000s, some of those partners had come to expect respondent to complete work on projects that they had generated, placing additional pressure on respondent to perform.

“Several years before respondent engaged in the within misconduct, MSLD established an executive committee to manage the law firm. Respondent perceived that the new arrangement rewarded some of the younger, income-generating attorneys, at his expense. Feeling exposed, he became “terrified” about losing his job. At that juncture, he grew even more reliant on Mandelbaum for protection:

So my desire and drive to please him became extremely strong. And I can’t tell you the number of times when I would have an issue with a client, I would hear the client five minutes later on the phone with Barry and then I would hear Barry’s footsteps stomping down the hall to basically dress me down or yell at me and to confront me, or whatever it might be very publicly.

And it was extremely upsetting and got to the point where I went from a lawyer who loved to go to work every day to a lawyer who dreaded pulling into the parking lot of my law firm, counting whose cars were in to try and decide whose work I should be doing that day so that I wouldn’t get yelled at or — or, you know, almost — I almost use the word bullied, although I’m an adult and was an adult at the time, and it’s a hard concept to have, but it’s the desperate situation I found myself in. (T20-10 to T21-2.)

“Worried about being ‘kicked out’ of MSLD, respondent felt tremendous pressure to complete tasks on time, according to schedules that other attorneys prepared for him. Also pressing was the fear that, because he was over sixty years old and had never been in another legal setting, he could not strike out on his own.”

The DRB Decision also found that the lawyer had no prior discipline, expressed remorse for his misconduct, and paid former clients, the firm and the DCA hundreds of thousands of dollars as restitution.  The DRB recommended a censure (which is a stronger sanction than a reprimand in New Jersey).  The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted that sanction and censured the lawyer.

Bottom line:  This case is unusual, to say the least.  Although the lawyer provided significant mitigation (including the serious “berating” by a supervising partner and “cracking under the pressure” of the partner’s criticism), his underlying misconduct, including his multiple false statements to clients, neglecting client matters and failing to communicate, would appear to be serious enough to merit a suspension, notwithstanding the mitigation that he provided.  The lawyer was in his 50’s and 60’s when the misconduct occurred. One could certainly conclude that the lawyer’s testimony about the “pressure” of the practice was somewhat of an excuse and not an explanation.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

 

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Lawyer receives 1 year suspension in New York and Oregon for, inter alia, falsely claiming completion of CLE

Hello everyone and welcome to this Ethics Alert which will discuss the recent New York appellate court opinion suspending a New York lawyer for one year on a reciprocal basis after he was suspended by the Oregon Supreme Court for one year for making false representations regarding his completion of the required Oregon CLE and providing false testimony.  The New York case is: Matter of Joseph R. Sanchez, 017 NY Slip Op 01869 (Appellate Division, Second Department March 15, 2017) and the New York opinion is here:  http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_01869.htm.  The Oregon disciplinary board opinion is here:  http://www.osbar.org/_docs/dbreport/dbr29.pdf

The lawyer was admitted to practice in both New York and Oregon.  He was required to complete 45 CLE hours for the 2009 to 2011 Oregon reporting period and he purchased on-line CLE courses.  Two days later, he certified to the Oregon Bar that he had completed the required 45 hours of CLE although he had not previously completed any CLE for that reporting period.

After receiving the lawyer’s certification, the Oregon Bar’s CLE administrator asked him how he was able to watch 48 hours of CLE courses in about one day.  The lawyer responded by providing copies of his CLE completion certificates.  He later provided “evasive, incomplete and/or untruthful” answers under oath. The panel also found that the lawyer made the misrepresentations knowingly and intentionally.

According to the New York opinion:

“The trial panel found the respondent’s overall testimony lacking in credibility:

(The lawyer’s) testimony was inconsistent with his prior writings, including an affidavit he prepared and signed under oath in 2012. The testimony he provided at the hearing was inconsistent with the testimony he previously provided at his deposition in this matter on September 3, 2014, which was also provided under oath. The [respondent] presented facts during his testimony that he had never presented before, notwithstanding having had multiple opportunities to have done so during the course of the [Oregon] Bar’s investigation. Put simply, the panel finds that the [respondent’s] testimony was untruthful. Lastly, the panel finds that the [respondent] made his misrepresentations knowingly and intentionally. The [respondent] was provided multiple opportunities to explain how he could have possibly fit 48 hours of work into a shorter (and potentially significantly shorter) period of time and each time he failed to do so. It is clear he changed the facts over time, [and] added explanations’ when prior ones were not accepted, with each subsequent explanation less plausible than the prior.”

The trial panel concluded that the respondent violated his duty to the public and to the legal profession when he intentionally and knowingly misrepresented to both Lawline and the Oregon Bar the fact that he had attended and successfully completed the CLE courses he had purchased.”

Based upon the reciprocal Oregon discipline (and the facts), the New York opinion suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for one year, beginning on April 14, 2017.  He was also required to “furnish satisfactory proof that during the period of suspension he (1) refrained from practicing or attempting to practice law, (2) fully complied with this order and with the terms and provisions of the written rules governing the conduct of disbarred and suspended attorneys (see 22 NYCRR 1240.15), (3) complied with the applicable continuing legal education requirements of 22 NYCRR 691.11(a), and (4) otherwise properly conducted himself.”

Bottom line:  It should certainly should go without saying that lawyers must never provide false information to the Bar (or at any other time); however, this lawyer apparently very blatantly believed that he could pass under the Bar radar in making the false representations.  He compounded the misconduct by providing “inconsistent testimony” that as “lacking in credibility.”  Not only is this conduct completely unethical, but lawyers should never assume that the Bar will fail to detect false representations such as these.

As always, if you have any questions about this Ethics Alert or need assistance, analysis, and guidance regarding ethics, risk management, or other issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.              

Disclaimer:  this e-mail is not an advertisement, does not contain any legal advice, and does not create an attorney/client relationship and the comments herein should not be relied upon by anyone who reads it.

Joseph A. Corsmeier, Esquire

Law Office of Joseph A. Corsmeier, P.A.

29605 U.S. Highway 19, N., Suite 150

Clearwater, Florida 33761

Office (727) 799-1688

Fax     (727) 799-1670

jcorsmeier@jac-law.com

www.jac-law.com

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Filed under Attorney discipline, Attorney Ethics, Attorney misrepresentation, deceit, dishonesty, False statements regarding CLE, fraud, joe corsmeier, Joseph Corsmeier, Lawyer discipline, Lawyer ethics, Lawyer Ethics and Professionalism, Lawyer false statements, Lawyer false statements in response to Bar complaint, Lawyer false testimony, Lawyer misrepresentation, Lawyer Professionalism, Lawyer sanctions